L\u27Harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted in the European Community by Bernstein, Anita
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
Summer 1991
L'Harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability
Attempted in the European Community
Anita Bernstein
Brooklyn Law School, anita.bernstein@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the European Law Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
31 Va. J. Int'l L. 673 (1990-1991)
L'Harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products
Liability Attempted in the European
Community
ANITA BERNSTEIN*
The European Community ("EC")', seeking to unify its laws of
products liability, promulgated a directive2 in 1985 that was greeted
with a chorus of praise.3 The EC had long aspired to reconcile the
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1. The EC was established in 1957 through the Treaty of Rome. See Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 189, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter
Treaty of Rome].
The Commission, Parliament and Council comprise the primary institutions of the
European Community. The Commission was created by combining the substantive duties of
the European Economic Community, the European Atomic Energy Community and the
European Coal and Steel Community. Treaty Instituting a Single Council and a Single
Commission of the European Community, Apr. 8, 1965, art. 9, 10 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C
152) 2 (1967). The Commission is responsible for the functioning and development of the
Common Market. The Parliament is elected by citizens of the Community's Member States,
and consists of 434 representatives. According to the Treaty of Rome, Parliament has only
"advisory and supervisory powers"; in practice, Parliament has certain budgetary powers
which bind the Member States. The task of the Council is to approximate the Member States'
economic policies. Each Member State delegates a representative to the Council. Under
lawmaking procedures in the Community, the Commission initiates and drafts a proposal and
submits it to the Council. The Parliament considers and comments on the proposal. The
Council adopts the proposal, which becomes law. See P. Mathijsen, A Guide to European
Community Law 11-53 (4th ed. 1985).
2. 28 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 210) 29 (1985) [hereinafter Directive]. A directive is an EC
law addressed to Member Nations of the Community. It is binding as to its result, but it leaves
to each nation the choice of form and methods to implement it. See Treaty of Rome. supra
note 1, art. 189.
3. Dielmann, The European Economic Community's Council Directive on Product
Liability, 20 Int'l L. 1391 (1986); Note, The European Community's Products Liability
Directive: Is the U.S. Experience Applicable?, 18 Law & Pol'y in Int'l Bus. 795 (1986)
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many national laws on the subject. In a stance familiar to American
readers of the Restatements of common law, the Council of the Com-
munity eschewed explicit movement away from existing rules. It
described its task as rather one of approximation: 4  to derive an ideal
law of products liability from the traditions of the twelve nations that
make up the European Community.
Titled "On the approximation of the laws, regulations and adminis-
trative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defec-
tive products",6 the Directive is known as a strict liability measure,
although the phrase "strict products liability" or "strict liability" does
not appear in it. Instead, "liability without fault on the part of the
producer' 7 signals its message. The Directive contains a detailed Pre-
amble that announces its goals and explains its substantive choices,
later detailed in specific articles. Major provisions include a "develop-
ment risks" defense (the exoneration of manufacturers for damage
caused by defects unknowable to them at the time of production),8 as
well as definitions of "producer" and "defective product," and a cap
on damages.9 The Commission has applied a familiar but ambiguous
term, "harmonization", to this effort.10
The word harmonization has carried over into academic commen-
tary. Writers agree that the Directive brings the twelve sovereigns
together in key. An expanding literature describes the major differ-
ences among the existing national laws, explains the need for unifica-
[hereinafter U.S. Experience]; Thieffry, Van Doom & Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the
EEC: Implementation, Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25
Tort & Ins. L.J. 65 (1989)[hereinafter Thieffry]. More skeptical, but ultimately approving,
comments on the Directive include Note, Defining the Limits of Liability: A Legal and
Political Analysis of the European Community Products Liability Directive, 25 Va. J. Int'l L.
729 (1985) (writing before Directive officially promulgated) [hereinafter Virginia Note].
Almost alone in its criticism of the Directive is Stapleton, Products Liability Reform-Real or
Illusory? 6 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 392 (1986).
4. See Directive, supra note 2, at Preamble; see also infra note 21.
5. The twelve Member States are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Other nations
in Europe are considering membership.
6. Directive, supra note 2.
7. Id. at Preamble.
8. See Directive, supra note 2, at art. 7. The defense is optional. See infra note 79. Liability
for development risks, or the state-of-the-art defense in American parlance, has confounded
analysis because it is unclear what type of change ought to impose responsibility on a
producer. For analysis of some conceptual problems of the defense as they relate to the
Directive, see Stolker, Objections to the Development Risk Defence, 9 Med. & L. 783 (1990).
9. See Directive, supra note 2, at art. 7(e) (development risks); arts. 2, 3, 6 (definitions); art.
16 (1) (cap on damages). Member States are free to accept or reject the damages cap.
10. Id. at Preamble; see Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 100.
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tion, and details some of the prior debates over substance." The
chords progress. Voices of experience echo the themes of melody and
resolution.12
The sounds from European Community nations themselves, how-
ever, have been discordant in the years since the Directive was
promulgated in 1985. Most nations disobeyed the order to adopt a
conforming statute before the deadline. 13 Other countries passed stat-
utes that the European Commission decided were nonconforming.' 4
Three years after the deadline, the Community has won a majority of
compliance. Eight of the twelve member nations have passed a prod-
ucts liability directive,1 5 but these statutes are acceptable to the Com-
mission primarily because the standards of compliance have been
relaxed.' 6 The last six years after promulgation have brought formal
proceedings for nonimplementation in the European Court of Jus-
tice, 7 attempts to compromise stalled in national governments,' 8 hesi-
tation to cooperate with the Directive, 9 and pointed exchanges of
correspondence between the Commission and the noncomplying
states.2' Even if all of these differences were resolved, and the Direc-
11. See supra note 3; see also Orban, Product Liability: A Comparative Legal
Restatement-Foreign National Law and the EEC Directive, 8 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L 342
(1978); Shettler, Products Liability: A Comparison of U.S. and EEC Approaches, 13 Syracuse
J. Int'l L. & Comm. 155 (1986).
12. According to Patrick Thieffry, a lawyer specializing in the European Community with a
practice based in New York and Paris, the "underlying logic of the Directive thus demands its
uniform application throughout the Community without further delay." Thieffry, supra note
3, at 91. "The very essence of the Directive," writes Hans Taschner, a division head at the
European Commission, "is the introduction of strict liability, which alone justifies all efforts
[and] transcends all other questions.. . ." Taschner, Product Liability in Europe: Future
Prospects, in EEC Strict Liability in 1992, at 85 (Practising Law Inst. 1989). See also
Bourgoignie, Where We Stand on Product Liability, 32 BEUC News (Feb. 1984) (Directive is
"the only solution possible"). The English Law Commission, the Scottish Law Commission,
and the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury have all
endorsed stricter liability laws. See Stapleton, supra note 3, at 392 n.l.
13. Member States were ordered to implement the Directive within three years after July
25, 1985. See Directive, supra note 2. As of August 1, 1988, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland,
France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain had not implemented
the Directive. Thieffry, supra note 3, at 77-79.
14. Id. at 77-82.
15. These nations are Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal and the United Kingdom.
16. Author's interview with Thieffry, June 13, 1990.
17. See Claveloux, EC Charges Six Countries Over Directive, Bus. Ins., Mar. 26. 1990, at 27
(proceedings brought against Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom).
18. See, e.g., Thieffry, supra note 3, at 80 (deadlock among affected ministries in France).
19. Id. at 79 (Belgium).
20. See Claveloux, supra note 17.
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tive implemented by all European Community nations, the increasing
amount of leeway that the Commission now condones will assure
divergent national laws in perpetuity.
This Article explores the reasons for the limited acceptance of a
directive that sought to achieve harmonization. Part I begins with an
inquiry into the meaning of harmonization,21 identifying three defini-
tions available to the Commission. The first describes harmonization
as a tactic of the Commission to supersede national rules in an effort
to create a stronger federation, and not so much to resolve conflicts.
This section concludes that this definition does not apply to the Direc-
tive. Law reform, the definition apparently favored by the Commis-
sion, is the second meaning examined. Law reform in the Community
reconciles national laws with a Community ideal rather than with one
another. This definition does apply to the Directive, and thereupon
the examination shifts from the descriptive to the normative: Is the
Directive a good idea? Analysis suggests that it is not. A final defini-
tion, approximation, describes an effort to unify, with minimal change
of law. Harmonization as approximation, a meaning rejected by the
EC lawmakers, would have led to more successful treatment of the
perceived problem in products liability.
Part II argues that the Directive rests on dubious jurisdictional
authority. Problems of jurisdiction also explain why national govern-
ments have responded to the Directive with dissonance. In the Con-
clusion, this Article observes how the Community has coped with the
fate of the Directive and how it continues to expand its understanding
of products liability.
I. HARMONIZATION
In a 1976 initiative to the Council on products liability,22 the prede-
cessor of the Directive, the Commission found an absence of harmony
in the products liability laws of the Member States.3 The Preamble
21. Several writers have inquired into the meaning of harmonization. The Treaty of Rome
uses "approximation" (rapprochement, Angleichung) as a term distinct from "harmonization"
(harmonization, harmonieren), but interpreters find it difficult to delineate the shades of
meaning between the words. A complication is that different language versions of the Treaty
use these terms inconsistently. See Dashwood, Hastening Slowly: The Community's Path
Towards Harmonization, in Policy Making in the European Community 180 (H. Wallace, W.
Wallace & C. Webb eds. 1983). One reference sheds little light on the problem by explaining
that approximation "represents, by definition, a more intensive process of integration than
harmonisation." D. Lasok & J. Bridge, Law and Institutions of the European Communities
458 (4th ed. 1987).
22. 19 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 241) 9 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Directive], Preamble.
23. Its Preamble declared that "[w]hereas the approximation of the laws of the Member
[Vol. 31:673
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to this proposal claimed that "rules on liability which vary in severity
lead to differing costs for industry in the various Member States
.... -24 According to the proponents of the Directive, this divergence
affected decisions to move goods with consumer protection varying
from country to country: "to this extent therefore a common market
for consumers does not as yet exist. . . ."I Harmonization would
reconcile these differences, according to the Commission. The three
subparts below consider the possible interpretations of harmonization
that might explain the decision to identify a products liability prob-
lem, and the proposed cure of a directive.
A. Power Politics
One view of harmonization, attributed to Hans von der Groeben, a
former member of the Commission,26 might explain the creation of
the ambitious Directive. Von der Groeben thought that harmoniza-
tion is used, and should be used, expressly to drive forward the crea-
tion of an integrated Community.27 This view favors maximum use of
power by the Commission. When conflicts between national laws
arise, the Commission should not mediate between them, but forge an
ideal resolution that would advance integration. According to von
der Groeben, a market "can only function optimally if the general
economic balance is guaranteed and the regional, structural and social
development is directed in a particular way."2 It would not do to
speak of elimination of barriers2 9 or to regard harmonization as the
search for a "mathematical mean between the national regulations. 30
A directive should impose on the Member States improvements to the
functioning of the Common Market. To detractors, the von der
Groeben approach pursues "harmonization for harmonization's
sake."
3 1
States concerning the liability of the producer for damage caused by the defectiveness of his
products is necessary, because the divergencies may distort competition in common
market;.. ." Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Speech by Hans von der Groeben to the European Parliament, Nov. 19, 1969, 1969-
1970 Eur. Pan. Deb. (No. 119) 148 (Nov. 27, 1969).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Dashwood, supra note 21, at 194. One author points out that Member States may
object to a harmonizing directive because it poses a threat to national sovereignty or is simply a
politically undesirable means to alter domestic legislation. See Virginia Note, supra note 3, at
757 n.160.
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In this light, the Directive can be read as a heroic effort to expand
the powers of the Community at the expense of individual national
autonomy. A power-politics interpretation would hold that the Com-
mission regarded explicit strict products liability as the optimal solu-
tion in light of the needs of the Community (per the von der Groeben
speech) or decided to aggrandize its power by promulgating a direc-
tive in accord with the law of no EC country (per the detractors' cyni-
cal gloss on the von der Groeben speech). In both explanations, the
Directive, though alien to European law, was a device aimed at
strengthening the federation.
Cynical theories are hard to disprove, but the maximalist strategy
of von der Groeben, in either a sincere or power-politics version, does
not explain the promulgation of the Directive. A review of the
changes in the Community shows that in the early 1970s the Commis-
sion abandoned the maximalist approach that flourished when von
der Groeben delivered his speech. Even if this approach continued to
exist during the late 1970s and early 1980s, it is improbable that the
Commission chose strict products liability as a tactic of European
integration.
Changes that took place in the EC from 1969, when von der
Groeben spoke, to 1985, when the Directive was approved by the
Council, moderated the ambition within the Commission to supersede
national laws. There became simply too much work to be done. As
the law grew more complex worldwide, the domains where the Com-
munity had an interest expanded correspondingly. For instance,
when von der Groeben delivered his speech, the EC had no environ-
mental policy;32 by the 1970s the environment was the subject of
directives and regulations.33 Consumerism, mergers and acquisitions,
and intellectual property, for examples, all consumed an expanding
share of EC resources, while more traditional concerns of the Com-
munity such as agriculture and competition law also increased in
importance.34 Consequently, more members and employees of the
Commission became specialists, addressing narrow problems.
Indirect effects also moderated the aims of the Commission. A
decision of the European Court of Justice, the Cassis de Dion case,35
firmly limited the power of an EC nation to use technical standards as
32. In 1973 the Community adopted a program for action in the environment. See Bulletin
Euro. Comm. Supp. 3/73.
33. Id.
34. See Dashwood, supra note 21, at 184-194.
35. REWE-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fuer Branntwein, 1979 E. Comm.
Ct.J. Rep. 649 (German minimum alcoholic content standards, which effectively ban the
[Vol. 31:673
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a protectionist device. 36  According to one scholar, this decision
demonstrated the power of "liberalization" 37 efforts, which are less
ambitious than harmonization, and suggested to Europeans that the
Commission might not need a centralizing type of harmonization to
effect its ends.3
Centralization within the Commission also encountered the practi-
cal problem of resistance to directives.39 A review of European Court
of Justice records shows an abrupt increase in the rate of nonimple-
mentation proceedings against Member States in the late 1970s. °
Although in theory the Commission must ultimately prevail in these
contests,41 they cost the Commission momentum and goodwill. The
EC appears to have decided that it cannot afford to promote centrali-
zation piecemeal in separate lawsuits.
These real-life obstacles to maximalism in the Commission
encouraged a shift to pragmatism. A less aggressive approach, dating
from about 1973, reduced criticism and disarmed opponents of the
EC.42 The Commission that wrote and revised the Directive had
moved away from the vision of von der Groeben.
B. Law Reform
Although the Commission probably did not create the Directive for
importation of certain potable spirits from other EC members, are prohibited under article 30
of the EC Treaty).
36. See Dashwood, supra note 21, at 186; Communication from the Commission
Concerning the Consequences of the Judgment Given by the Court of Justice on 20 February
1979 in Case 120/78 ('Cassis de Dijon'), 23 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 256) 2 (1980) (setting out
guidelines covering national technical measures affecting trade within the common market);
see also 23 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 253) 2 (1980).
37. Liberalization is defined as the removal of barriers to free trade within the common
market, such as customs duties on imports or exports. See Dashwood, supra note 21, at 182.
38. Dashwood, supra note 21, at 197. Dashwood adds that new membership in the EC of
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, and the United Kingdom while the Directive was being prepared,
and Spain and Portugal since then, also scattered the focus of the Commission. Id. at 196-97.
39. See section II(B) (discussing significance of resistance to the Directive).
40. One might, of course, argue that the increase in nonimplementation proceedings
demonstrates von der Groeben's concept of the Commission as an aggressive centralizer, but
most observers have characterized these proceedings as debilitating to the Commission. See
Dashwood, supra note 21, at 204.
41. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 169, 171.
42. Dashwood, supra note 21, at 205. Another commentator has argued that a more
aggressive approach flourished in the EC in 1985 and 1986, when the Presidency of the
Community was held by representatives of "pro-Europeanist" nations (Italy, Luxembourg,
and the Netherlands). See Nielsson, "Europe, 1992": Riding High on the Fourth Wave, 1990
Brigham Young U. L. Rev. 1575, 1595. The pro-Europeanists favored the adoption of new
action programs designed to achieve the Single Integrated Market by 1992. Id. at 1594. The
date of the Directive falls within this period, but its prior drafts do not.
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the maximalist reasons detailed above, modesty or minimalism is an
equally unlikely descriptive explanation. Evidence suggests that the
lawmaking institutions of the Community decided to reform the prod-
ucts liability laws of Europe and not merely seek out their common
denominator. Under the law-reform definition of harmonization, the
Community aimed to improve rather than reconcile its laws. Only
this definition explains the creation of the Directive.
This evidence begins with the Commission's 1965 attempt to write
a definition of harmonization.43 Although not very intelligible, this
statement seems to afford the Commission much opportunity to cre-
ate a better, as well as a more unified, law. For its part, Parliament
has gone on record as endorsing expansion of consumer protection in
Europe, with products liability reform a stated element of that expan-
sion.' One commentator quotes an unnamed Commissioner as hav-
ing said that official statements calling for harmonization simply
constituted "formalistic justification[s] for introducing new social pol-
icy .... "4 5 The origins of the Directive suggest an appreciation for
American-style, forthright strict products liability as a consumerist
measure rather than a desire to align European laws with one another.
These ambitions require a formal jurisdictional basis,46 and the law-
reforming proponents of the Directive have found it in the Treaty of
Rome and its meliorist ambitions. Signatories to the Treaty of Rome
"[d]ecided to ensure the economic and social progress of the countries
by common action in eliminating the barriers which divide Europe.) 47
The Treaty looked forward to thriving "industrial, agricultural and
commercial" sectors, 48 filled with working Europeans who would pro-
duce and consume all the better because of their community. Eco-
nomic and social progress refers to a major purpose of the
Community: the coexistence of free markets49 and a modem, humane
welfare state.50 All citizens should enjoy the benefits of prosperity
43. [T]he object is to create not a comprehensive single European legal system but a
system of federal type drawing its strength and prestige at once from the history,
diversity and vigor of the laws of the Member States, from jurisprudence common to
all the countries and from the needs of economic concentration.
Eighth General Report of the EEC, 1965, para. 2.
44. See European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Consumer Policy, PE
100.200, EN 111/0 [hereinafter Directorate General].
45. See Orban, supra note 11, at 379.
46. See infra section II on Jurisdiction.
47. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, Preamble.
48. Report of the Legal Affairs Committee, 1978-1979 Eur. ParI. Doc. (No. 246 ) 7 (1978)
[hereinafter Legal Affairs]. See also infra section 2A (discussing ultra vires argument).
49. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, arts. 110-116 (commercial policy).
50. Id. arts. 117-122 (social policy) and arts. 123-128 (establishing European Social Fund).
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through a general increase in the standard of living.51 But prosperity
is impossible without free trade and an atmosphere conducive to
business.
Although economic progress and social progress are each depen-
dent on the other, a distinct bifurcation between the two is evident in
the Treaty of Rome.52 The Directive follows this bifurcation. Its Pre-
amble expressly declares that justice requires a transfer of burden
between business and consumers. The economic camp must some-
what give way to the social camp. Because the Directive was con-
structed in this dichotomous manner, the discussion of the Directive
as law reform, below, respects its bifurcation.
1. Economic Progress
According to its Preamble, the Directive is needed for harmoniza-
tion of the laws of the member nations, because "the existing diver-
gencies may distort competition and affect the movement of goods"
within the Community.53  In an ideal Community, goods would be
distributed throughout the Common Market, without the barriers of
divergent laws. The EC has maintained that economic progress will
result when national barriers are removed.' Predicted benefits
include a rational division of labor within the Community, lower pro-
duction costs, and larger-scale production with a resultant increase in
productivity and wages.
a. Decisions to Move Goods
The promoters of the Directive argued that the existing differences
among products liability laws had the potential to influence the deci-
sion to market goods." To assert this claim, the promoters must have
believed that the divergences could be cured. This speculation, made
before the promulgation of the Directive, overstates the effects of the
existing divergences and understates the level of divergence that
would continue after reform. A look at the American federal system
would have shown that the absence of strict products liability did not
inhibit decisions to move goods, and the onset of strict liability did
not make interstate commerce more unified.56
51. Id. art. 2.
52. See supra notes 50-51 referring to the economic and social policies.
53. Directive, supra note 2, Preamble.
54. See Directorate General, supra note 44.
55. See id. No actual influence has been proved. See Legal Affairs, supra note 48, at 11.
56. Supporters of the Directive generally disdain this comparison. Of course, the analogy
comparing a single nation to a federation of nations is imperfect. But one commentator faults
1991]
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Moreover, the argument assumes that the Directive would be a
powerful remedial device capable of eliminating the divergences by
sending a clear signal to consumers, producers, lawyers and judges.
Thus, strict liability would have the same meaning in all EC nations,
divergences would disappear, and producers would move goods more
evenly into each country." The flaw is that case-by-case adjudication
will continue. Each judge will begin the task of applying the Direc-
tive with little relevant expertise, because the implemented Directive
will remain changeable at least in the short term, according to its own
requirements of perpetual reevaluation;5" and even when stability is
achieved the Directive will be flexible.59 The judge will become a kind
of learned juror, able to apply her own opinion of the facts against a
background of law derived secondhand. Suppliers and producers will
find this system, at least initially, to have some of the randomness of
the American jury trial system (without, of course, the same risk of
very high damages), unless they can use pre-Directive experience to
predict how each judge will apply the Directive. Where such predic-
tion is possible, producers are no better off with the Directive than
without it.
Because the wealthiest EC nations have the most liberal rules of
recovery in that they most resemble the Directive, any shift in the
movement of goods appears to favor these countries. To the extent
that Greece or Portugal becomes ein Paradies fJr Kliger60 like
France, producers might as well ship goods into the most prosperous
EC nations. If movement of goods follows changes in the law, an
improbable claim, then the Directive will channel this movement
away from those EC countries that could benefit most from increased
the analogy by focusing on an irrelevant difference: all American jurisdictions are equally
lawless because juries assess liability and set verdicts. See Whincup, Product Liability Laws in
Common Market Countries, 19 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 521, 537-38 (1982). In other words, it
is idle to speak of liability doctrine in a place where civil juries give away money. Whincup is
wrong, I believe, because the change to strict liability in the U.S. did indeed have
consequences. See infra text accompanying notes 98-127.
57. But see Thieffry, supra note 3, at 84 (claiming that optional provisions of the Directive
will not produce the same results).
58. See Directive, supra note 2, at art. 15(3) (review of development risk defense scheduled
for 1995); art. 16 (review of cap on damages); art. 21 (review of Directive every five years by
Commission). The Commission also retains the power to monitor the products liability laws of
the Member States. Id. at art. 20.
59. For an argument that reform of private law can never, despite its efforts, eliminate
flexibility and ought not to try, see Bernstein, A Theory of Products Liability Reform (in
progress).
60. "A paradise for plaintiff." See Stiefel, The Advantages of a "Civilized" Procedure in
Civil Law Product Liability (notes for speech sent to author, Dec. 14, 1989) [copy on file at
Virginia Journal of International Law] ("caveat Amerika, ein Paradies fdr Kliiger").
[Vol. 31:673
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commerce.
61
b. Predictability
American business leaders have complained that the worst aspect
of U.S. tort law is its uncertainty. High costs can be anticipated, but
unpredictable costs defy planning and burden such decisions as pric-
ing and risk management. 2 Although this complaint has focused on
American vagaries, as a general rule any business will approach a
more profitable level of production when it obtains better information
about costs.6 3
In addition to the drawbacks discussed above, the Directive will
diminish predictability because its crucial rules are open-ended. It is
true that the Directive gives consumers crisp and unequivocal infor-
mation about the claims they may bring. An injured European con-
sumer, even one in privity with a potential defendant, has a tort cause
of action in strict products liability. In addition, the Directive broad-
ens and clarifies the accepted definition of "producer."" For poten-
tial defendants, however, almost any potential source of certainty
about liability exposure is kept obscure.6"
Whether the Directive mandates defenses based on a plaintiff's con-
duct is also obscure. Article 7 contains a defenses clause, but does not
mention contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or product mis-
use. 66 The Directive says that recovery "may be reduced or disal-
lowed" when the injured person is at fault,67 and the Preamble
apparently disapproves of product misuse and contributory negli-
gence.6 8 A reader, however, is hard pressed to determine what this
language means. The Directive appears to endorse, but not quite
require, plaintiff's-conduct defenses.
61. My colleague Steven Heyman sensibly comments that if the claim is false, the Directive
will not channel trade away from poor countries but will allow consumers to recover more
easily from producers who come from richer countries. This point reveals a dilemma of the
Directive's proponents. As a jurisdictional matter, they have contended that the status quo
affects the movement of goods. But their reformist hopes depend on the opposite assumption.
62. See McGovern, The Impact of Product Liability, 908 Conference Bd. Res. Rep. vii, 1-2
(1988).
63. The profit-maximizing firm chooses the output that brings marginal cost up to price.
Attention to costs is rewarded: when a firm adjusts output to yield a more exact equivalence of
marginal cost to price, the firm makes more money. See D. McCloskey, The Applied Theory
of Price 237-38 (2d ed. 1985).
64. See Thieffry, supra note 3, at 69; see also Stapleton, supra note 3, at 398.
65. But see Directive, supra note 2, at art. 11 (requiring ten-year rule of repose).
66. Id. at art. 7.
67. Id. at art. 8(2).
68. See id. at Preamble.
19911
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Altogether avoided is the question of liability for patent defects.
The adoption of a consumer expectation test for defects suggests that
a producer might not be liable for injury caused by an obvious hazard:
a reasonable consumer would expect a patent hazard to pose a risk.69
But the consumer expectation test in America, one of the few places
where it has been tried, has not been linked reliably to a patent-danger
exculpation. 70 The patent-danger defense, which used to exonerate
American manufacturers before strict products liability took hold,
would tend to reduce the level of litigation. A repudiation of the
defense in the Directive would tend to increase litigation. Ambiguity
keeps the issue unpredictable.
In addition, the preservation of contractual remedies means that
Member States may permit some products liability actions that will
not be governed by the Directive.71 This preservation would have lit-
tle effect in the United States, where strict products liability has
superseded implied warranty, but in Europe contract and tort have
coexisted more equally in products liability actions.72 EC countries
have long regarded contract as the proper basis for recovery by plain-
tiffs in contractual privity with the producer.73 Although European
jurists, like their American counterparts, view contract damages as
more circumscribed than tort damages, this construction may be
adjusted after adoption of the Directive, in response to changes in the
rules of damages and liability. The relative strength of contract law
means that a producer cannot depend on the Directive to occupy the
field of products liability.74
The Directive also may squander the benefits of lower insurance
premiums that probably would have resulted if there had been no
69. See Priest, Products Liability and the Accident Rate, in Liability: Perspectives and
Policy 184, 210 (R. Litan & C. Winston eds. 1988).
70. See Lovell v. Marion Power Shovel Co., Inc., 909 F.2d 1088, 1091-92 (7th Cir. 1990)
(patentness of danger does not defeat claim under consumer expectation test); see also Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P. 2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975) (same). The
consumer expectation test for design defect has been in decline in the United States. See
Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 104[D], Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62, 721 (1979)
(rejecting test); D. Fischer & W. Powers, Products Liability: Cases and Materials 67-68 (1988)
(collecting criticisms of test). But note Whincup's warning that doctrine in American liability
law is not to be taken too seriously. See Whincup, supra note 56.
71. One admirer of the Directive admits the seriousness of this problem. See Hondius, The
Impact of the Products Liability Directive on Legal Development and Consumer Protection in
Western Europe, 4 Canterbury L. Rev. 35, 41-42 (1989).
72. See section I(C) (discussion of contract principles).
73. Id.
74. Opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Ann. V, Legal Affairs,
supra note 48, at 27 (potential for contract damages in excess of Directive cap).
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directive. The post-1992 single market is expected to create intense
competitive pressure, pushing down the price of premiums, but the
uncertainty of the Directive will exert a counterpressure. After pro-
mulgation, insurers predicted an increase in the number and size of
products liability claims.75 Though self-serving, this forecast was
plausible. Commentators accepted projections of a 5-20% increase in
the cost of premiums,76 although the evidence of actual increases in
countries that have implemented the Directive is scant.77
Very likely the Directive adds some new uncertainty. It is now
apparent to Member States that the Commission, which monitors the
Directive, has new expanded powers to pass judgment on their laws,
but less apparent is exactly how to anticipate the way the Commission
will read the Directive. Defensive maneuvers are likely to follow.
Another potential dynamic is interplay among Member States. For
example, within the EC debate the United Kingdom is known to
favor a strong development risks defense,78 but what does it think of
the partial implementation of this defense that has resulted?79 Will
country A change course in reaction to country B? The veneer of
harmonization obscures and distorts conflicts.
c. Competitiveness
Any relationship of liability rules to competitive strength in world
markets is so tenuous that neither proponents nor critics of the Direc-
tive can resolve the point. But at least one proponent has tried.
Thierry Bourgoignie, an early defender of the Directive, 8° has argued
that the change to strict products liability will not "do damage to the
75. See Drag, Managing Risk in 1992, Bus. Ins., Oct. 9, 1989, at 43.
76. See id.; Whitehead, Product Liability and European Integration, in The European
Economic Community: Products Liability Rules and Environmental Policy 77, 83 (Practising
Law Inst. 1990) [hereinafter European Economic Community]. See also Dielmann, supra note
3, at 1400 (predicting price increase for insurance premiums because Directive "tightens" and
expands liability).
77. See, e.g., Schwartz, Product Liability and Medical Malpractice in Comparative Context,
in The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation 28, 41 (P.
Huber & R. Litan eds. 1991) (no increase in premiums in Germany after implementation of
Directive).
78. See 991 House of Commons Deb. 1111 (Nov. 4, 1980) (statement of Sally Oppenheim,
Minister of Consumer Affairs); Hondius, supra note 71, at 41.
79. The Directive provides that notwithstanding its development risks defense, see
Directive, supra note 2, at art. 7(e), a Member State may abrogate this defense, see Directive,
art. 15(1)(b), if it complies with certain requirements, see Directive, art. 15(2), which include
notice to the Commission and a nine-month standstill period. To date, only Luxembourg has
chosen to suppress the defense.
80. Bourgoignie, supra note 12.
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competitivity of European firms on the international level."'" In sup-
port of this statement, he adds that "the principle of responsibility
with fault is being abandoned by Member States," and has been
rejected by other nations, namely the United States, Japan and New
Zealand. 2
This assertion, merely a variation on the simultaneous claim that
the Directive is urgently needed but will change nothing,83 is unjusti-
fied. The claim overlooks the existence of trade relations between EC
countries and nations other than the three mentioned, and defies such
rare but significant experiences as the Bhopal case, where the prospect
of reaching a more generous forum shaped the litigation and raised its
stakes.84 That expanded products liability injures competitiveness as
long as other countries defer more abjectly to business interests is an
argument which in the U.S. has come from explicitly partisan
sources.85 Disinterested writers have not proved a connection.86 All
81. Id. Later writing, after the Directive became more neutral, reveals a disillusioned
Bourgoignie. See, e.g., Bourgoignie, Product Liability: Old Arguments for a New Debate?
European Consumer L.J. 6, 17 (1986) (achievements of Directive too scant); see infra notes
203-04 and accompanying text (discussing compromises in the Directive).
82. See Bourgoignie, supra note 81. Japan and New Zealand have actually "abandoned"
tort litigation in favor of a compensation scheme. See Bill of Consumer Product Safety Laws
of 1973 (Japan); Accident Compensation Act of 1972 (New Zealand). Moreover, the principle
of responsibility with fault is if anything renascent in the United States. See Henderson &
Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change,
37 UCLA L. Rev. 479, 480 (1990).
83. For other examples, see Bourgoignie, supra note 3.
84. See In Re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984,
634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
Access to a jury, of course, encouraged those plaintiffs and lawyers who sought to try Union
Carbide in the United States. But strict products liability, in the loose sense of liberal recovery
that the Directive endorses, was at least as great an inducement.
85. See Office of the Vice President, Fact Sheet on Product Liability Reform (undated
document, ca. 1989, on file with Virginia Journal of International Law) (advocating "fault
based liability" as essential to "U.S. international competitiveness"); Why reforming our
liability system is essential if America is to succeed in overseas markets, insurer advertisement,
Time, Nov. 27, 1989, at I ("One positive step would be to base liability suits on fault.");
Product Liability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and
Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 42
(1987) (statement of Robert H. Malott, member, Product Liability Coordinating Committee).
See also Besharov, Forum Shopping, Forum Skipping, and the Problem of International
Competitiveness, in New Directions in Liability Law 139 (W. Olson ed. 1988) (American
liability rules handicap American producers in world trade).
The liability system has been blamed for the American trade deficit, over $100 billion in
1989. Basic macroeconomic rules contradict this claim. If liability rules make American
exports more expensive, then demand among foreign buyers for these goods falls, and
consequently the demand for U.S. dollars falls. The decline of the dollar makes American
goods cheaper in the world market, and demand for them increases. Thus a trade deficit can
exist only in the short term. See Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade
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other things being equal, however, European manufacturers would
compete better in world markets under a products liability law that
afTrmed the principle of fault-based responsibility. Inasmuch as strict
products liability foments litigation, costs to manufacturers increase.
In a fault-based regime, the Directive would not force manufacturers
to speculate about the effects of an unfamiliar law. Consumers would
not receive tacit encouragement to bring more products liability law-
suits. These effects are slight, but they may matter. The U.S. and
Japan, important competitor nations, function in domestic markets
with liability rules that are either stable or moving in favor of
defendants. 7
2. Social Progress
A social-progress argument in favor of the Directive would main-
tain that explicit and expanded strict products liability advances the
goals of the Treaty of Rome. It is socially optimal to reduce the rate
of accidents and, where accidents cannot be avoided, to impose the
burden of compensation on the producer. Strict liability based on a
product defect gives producers an incentive to make various safety
investments, inspect, redesign, communicate warnings, and anticipate
misuse in ways that may not be mandated by a negligence rule.88
Losses that result from unavoidable accidents, or accidents that the
manufacturer chooses not to avoid, ought to be charged to the manu-
facturer. The justifications are familiar: the manufacturer profits
from the enterprise; it can spread the loss by increasing prices or buy-
Performance: Myths and Realities, in Tort Law and the Public Interest: Competition.
Innovation, and Consumer Welfare 127, 129-32 (P. Schuck ed. 1991). Macroeconomic rules
do not, however, defeat the claim that an expensive or unjust liability system can lower both
the ability of firms to compete outside the jurisdiction, and the standard of living for people
within it.
86. See, e.g., P. Reuter, The Economic Consequences of Expanded Corporate Liability: An
Exploratory Study 34-42 (1988) (RAND Corporation Study) (little evidence of effect on
competitiveness).
87. For a description of the American shift toward pro-defendant lawmaking in the 1980s.
see Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 82, at 539-40.
88. That "defect" necessarily means something like "fault," at least in design cases, is an
insight often attributed to a 1980 article by Sheila Birnbaum. See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg.
Co., 421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W. 2d 176 (1984) (citing Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design
Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L Rev.
593, 601 (1980)). But see Schwartz, Understanding Products Liability, 67 Calif. L Rev. 435.
493 (1979) (articulating the same idea). Despite this resemblance between strict liability and
negligence, lawsuits brought before the strict liability era that alleged injury by a product were
more likely to be resolved in favor of manufacturers. It was not negligence rules as such, but
rather a narrow view of manufacturer responsibility, that exonerated defendants in this
"negligence" era. See Priest, supra note 69, at 202-07 (summarizing cases).
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ing insurance; it ought to stand behind its products; it has better infor-
mation than the user about dangers; by placing the products on the
market, it represents to buyers that the product is safe.89 These twin
benefits, insurance and incentives to safety, promote social progress.
This reasoning, though not without some merit, suffers from its
obvious connection to the American use of strict products liability as
an instrument to achieve insurance and safety. Simply put, the Amer-
ican record is mixed. Its reputation is worse, as is evident from the
strenuous arguments of the Directive's proponents that Europe is not
really trying to emulate the American experience.90 In looking to
American products liability law for inspiration, the European Com-
munity linked both the substance and the appearance of the Directive
to a flawed model.
Strict products liability as a source of insurance and safety has
received extensive attention in American legal literature. These writ-
ings suggest that liability delivers very poor insurance. It has
enhanced safety, although a commitment to regulation, which exists
in Europe to a greater degree than the United States, would have done
so more effectively. Change in doctrine as a source of safety and
insurance, in sum, is an adaptation shifted to the United States, a
country that has thus far refused to enact serious regulation or to
assure social welfare.91
a. The Insurance Rationale
With medical care, income maintenance and disability protection
guaranteed at a high level, a typical user of products in Europe is ab
initio more protected than his American counterpart. All Member
States of the EC have state-administered health insurance schemes.92
Plans vary: The National Insurance Scheme and National Health
Scheme of the United Kingdom are comprehensive systems designed
by statute and managed by the government;9" in Germany, regional
and local organizations administer insurance in a decentralized
scheme;94 nine statutes cover social security and public health in the
89. See W. Prosser, J. Wade & V. Schwartz, Cases and Materials on Torts 721 (8th ed.
1988).
90. See Bourgoignie, supra note 3; Thieffry, supra note 3, at 88-90 (discussing unlikely
possibility of liability crisis in Europe).
91. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
92. See Report on Social Developments-Year 1986, Addendum to the 2d General Report
on the Activities of the Community at VII-1 (1987).
93. See A. Kahn & S. Kamerman, Social Services in International Perspective 35 (1985).
94. See 1989 Europa World Y.B. 1126.
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Netherlands.95 Observers are often struck by the lack of stigma
attached to public social services in Western Europe; citizens partake
of what they need as a right.96
Despite this protection, the Directive favors litigation as a source of
payment for injury. The Community has slighted its combination of
assured compensation and well-developed principles of liability in
favor of an alternative known chronically to fail as a source of com-
pensation, and to waste money. Why? A ready explanation is that
the health systems in Western Europe face deficits. For several years
the national governments have confronted increases in the cost of
health care, and discussed ways to reduce spending. Studies under-
taken by the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development reveal an array of deficit-reducing measures, designed
by each national government to match its health care scheme.9 A
more conservative political climate, the growth of expensive health-
care technology, and an increase in non-European ethnic populations
have combined to create a sense of finitude. In the spirit of austerity
that began in the mid-1980s, many Europeans regard universal health
care as a luxury of potentially infinite expense.
Strict products liability, it may be speculated, looked attractive to a
Commission preoccupied with health-care deficits. For all its short-
comings, strict products liability buttresses a welfare system in a
country that lacks universal health coverage. Under American-style
liability, private insurers pay much of the medical costs for which
European governments assume responsibility. The many flaws of
American health insurance do not include government deficits, as the
government has not undertaken the obligation of comprehensive med-
95. In the Netherlands, the five general National Insurance acts cover old.age pensions,
widows' and orphans' pensions, children's allowances, disablement pensions and exceptional
medical expenses. Additional legislation benefitting workers covers health insurance, sickness
benefits, working incapacity insurance and unemployment benefits. See id. at 1862.
96. See A. Kahn & S. Kamerman, supra note 93, at 316, 331.
97. The three major devices tried in Europe have been the introduction of market
competition forces, the implementation of user payments and the narrowing of health plan
coverage. Britain has tried to create more competition for the National Health Service by
allowing private physicians to perform elective surgery under NHS subcontracts, and by
adding incentives to the compensation of NHS physicians. 1988-1989 Survey, Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development 1, 79 (1979). France has retreated from paying
for all drugs, and tried to curb the supply of physicians. Id. at 78, 127. In its scheme of
insurance-funded health care, Germany has narrowed the coverage of medical expenses,
refunded a part of contributions to consumers who do not file a claim during the year, and
made other reforms leading to an estimated saving of DM 12.4 billion. Id. at 95. In the
Netherlands, the Dekker Commission recommended several reforms in a 1988 report, some of
which have been implemented. Id. at 46-47.
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ical care. A liability rule that would shift part of this expense to cor-
poration insurers and shareholders probably tempted beleaguered
national governments, and their representatives in Community insti-
tutions. The Directive reflects a hope that expanded liability might
save government funds some money.
Unfortunately for the Directive, its gestation coincided with what
became known as the insurance crisis in the United States.98 The
appeal of American-style strict products liability as reducer of deficits
has lessened: Defenders of the Directive have been forced continually
to argue that the Directive will not precipitate an American-style cri-
sis in Europe.99 A change in academic language may have affected
the Directive as well. The "fair apportionment" justification for the
Directive, written in the 1970s, reflects a time when strict products
liability was viewed approvingly as a loss-spreading mechanism. In
the U.S. today, the idea of loss spreading is in disrepute:100 strict prod-
ucts liability is now said to offer "insurance," and those who use this
word deem it very poor insurance. The shift in discourse has changed
the progress of the Directive.
In an important paper on the insurance crisis, George Priest moved
the polarized tort reform debate to a new conjunction. 1'0 Whereas
debaters had argued on behalf of either plaintiffs or defendants, Priest,
who is identified with defendants, argued that expansive liability justi-
fied as loss spreading was bad for all consumers, especially low-
income consumers, exactly the parties expansive liability was designed
to aid."°2 This conclusion came from the insight that liability does not
simply shift a cost from point P to point D but rather creates an insur-
ance apparatus bloated by transaction costs 1 3 and the paired ills of
adverse selection' °4 and moral hazard. 105 As is well known, the
American tort system pays this insurance money inefficiently: About
half the total cost of the system is retained by claimants, and only half
98. I use the term to refer to a period beginning in the 1970s and recurring intermittently
through the next ten years, possibly longer. The exact nature of the crisis has been the subject
of debate. Critics have challenged virtually every datum offered by the industry in its tort
reform effort. See Comment, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort
Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 Emory L.J. 401 (1988).
99. See Thieffry, supra note 3, at 88-90; Bourgoignie, supra note 12.
100. See, e.g., Griffith, Products Liability-Negligence Presumed: An Evolution, 12 J.
Prod. Liab. 201, 225-28 (1989).
101. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521 (1987).
102. Id. at 1525, 1551, and 1585-87.
103. Id. at 1560.
104. Id. at 1540-50 and 1562-70.
105. Id. at 1547-48.
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of this sum represents compensation for economic loss."0 6
Priest expanded the debate by arguing that the liability system has
had three major retrogressive effects. First, expansive and unpredict-
able liability rules have caused insurers to reduce the level of cover-
age, raise their premiums, or refuse to issue insurance altogether.1°"
Consequently, municipalities"0 8 and certain industries"°° suffer from
decreased availability of insurance. Second, hard-to-insure products
are no longer profitable, and consumers experience a reduced supply
of goods, including necessities."t 0 Finally, all consumers must pay
more for their goods and services because product prices reflect the
increased cost of insurance. This increase burdens poorer consumers
more."' Priest also noted that a plaintiff's economic status affects the
measure of her damages awarded by a jury.t t2 Thus, although the
insurance of civil liability charges equal premiums to all consumers,
overall the poor and low-income suffer more than high-income
consumers. 
1 13
106. See Tillinghast, Tort Cost Trends: An International Perspective 15 (1989) [ereinafter
Tillinghast Study]. A RAND study suggests that these figures should be read with caution.
The RAND study, unlike the one done by Tillinghast, did not include the costs of operating
the insurance system. RAND researchers found that the tort system in the U.S. cost between
$29 billion and $36 billion in 1985, in contrast to the S117 billion that Tillinghast estimated.
The figures presented in the RAND study include compensation paid to plaintiffs, legal fees
and related expenses for both plaintiffs and defendants, insurance company costs of processing
claims in suit and the value of the litigants times' spent, and the costs of operating the tort
system. See J. Kakalik & N. Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort Litigation vi-vil
(RAND Corporation Study 1986). But see Litan, supra note 85, at 133 (Tillinghast figures
underinclusive because they exclude costs of diverting corporate officials from regular duties,
and of risk avoidance measures). The general contrast between compensation schemes and
liability appears accurate. By contrast, workers' compensation returns 70% of its total cost to
beneficiaries; private health insurance 85%, and public social security 991%. Tillinghast Study
at 16. Industry has made much of data like these. For a reminder that defense interests have
not always preferred the efficiency of workers' compensation to the process-heavy tort system,
see Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
107. Priest, supra note 101, at 1570-1578. Priest attributes these responses to the "rapid
departure of low-risk insured from commercial casualty pools." Id. at 1578.
108. Id. at 1574-82.
109. Id. at 1582-84 (discussing health industry).
110. Id. at 1566-70.
111. I thank my colleague Richard Wright, who disagrees with much of this section, for
pointing out that the poor are injured by defective products more often than the rich, and
therefore might, as a class, benefit from a system of higher liability/higher prices, Priest
notwithstanding.
112. Id. at 1552.
113. This version of the liability story rests in part on the idea that the insurance industry
has acted in good faith, a premise that Priest does not question. Others have suggested that the
insurance industry might have canceled policies or withheld coverage for contingencies that
were profitable to insure, in a conspiracy to influence legislatures and public opinion. See
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., (1986)
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A defender of the Directive might reply that little of this criticism
applies to the EC. Civil damages are set by judges, which means that
European judges would have to be as prejudiced as American jurors
to sustain Priest's point of damages discrepancy.' 14 Because damages
are so much lower in Europe, the overall impact of discrepancies is
less. The liability systems throughout Europe run much more
cheaply than their American counterpart, undermining the argument
about transaction costs. 15 Because a European plaintiff cannot
recover as much for noneconomic loss, the portion of Priest's argu-
ment criticizing the availability, on a third-party basis, of insurance
(statement of Joan Claybrook); Comment, supra note 98, at 409; Trebilcock, The Social
Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modem North American Tort Law: A Canadian
Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 San Diego L. Rev. 929, 936 (1987)
(conspiracy unlikely).
A basic problem with the Priest critique of modem American tort law has to do with the
impossibility of separating recovery grounded in an insurance justification from recovery based
on tort principles of responsibility. Particularly because most products liability cases brought
to trial are decided by juries in secret deliberations, it is difficult, even with careful instructions,
to keep a quasi-insurance function out of liability decisions. Priest has called for the excision
of the insurance function in civil liability via a change in the liability standard. See Priest,
Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 2301 (1989). But he has
said little more about his proposed replacement than that it is a "sophisticated" and "modem"
return to "a form of economic negligence," which would evaluate the producer's opportunity
to make safety-related investments. See Priest, The Deep Justification for Tort Reform, in
Product Liability Reform: Debating the Issues 7, 11 (K. Chilton ed. 1990). A likely, if not
planned, effect of this change would be a reduction in aggregate payments by defendants to
plaintiffs. While this change may represent a conceptual improvement in doctrine, the liability
system in the United States may need the additional boost of an insurance justification to
compensate for disincentives to sue. Without the insurance function, total claims by users
might be too low for an optimal effect in the accident rate. Cf. Priest, supra note 69, at 221-22
(introduction of strict liability standard "may have improved accident prevention incentives,"
even though prior negligence standard ought to have required cost-justified safety measures).
As for the insurance component of strict products liability, even though the coverage is biased
and not what low-income consumers in particular would purchase, it is for a number of
Americans the only health insurance they have. Estimates suggest that more than 30 million
persons in the U.S. have no health insurance. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Health
Insurance: A Profile of the Uninsured in Michigan and the United States (1990). Millions
more are underinsured, and medical treatment available to the uninsured poor is inadequate.
See generally Feder, Hadley & Mullner, Poor People and Poor Hospitals: Implications for
Public Policy, J. Health Pol., Pol'y & Law 237 (1984).
114. To the extent that the American discrepancies can be attributed to factors other than
prejudice by the jury-for example, more zealous advocacy for certain plaintiffs by their
attorneys, or biased supervision by the trial judge-comparisons with Europe remain valid.
115. The Tillinghast study, using estimates and other private information, has calculated
the cost of the tort system as a percentage of gross national output for several nations. The
U.S. percentage is 2.5. The EC countries studied by Tillinghast-Denmark, Spain, Italy, the
United Kingdom, West Germany, Belgium, and France-all spend about 0.5% of their GNP
on their tort system. Tillinghast Study, supra note 106, at 12. Again, although the Tillinghast
data may state inaccurately the cost of American liability, as a source of comparison they are
sound.
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unavailable to first-party buyers diminishes in the European
Community.
But this response fails. Priest confined his lament to the United
States not because of conditions unique to the western hemisphere but
because the U.S. is the only country that has accepted the loss-spread-
ing approach to compensation. The criticism will apply to all future
takers. Insurance companies, playgrounds (said to have closed
because of the "crisis"), racism, disregard for women's economic con-
tributions and moral hazard are not American quirks. They will
affect any legal system that links strict products liability to compensa-
tion. In its Preamble announcing the appropriate allocation of tech-
nological risks, the Directive forges this link.
The need to separate liability from compensation is familiar in
American writing about torts. Civil liability can never compensate
injured persons adequately, because liability is a function of fault, or
responsibility, rather than need.'" 6 The Directive is correct in saying
that fault-based liability is the wrong way to compensate for injury
caused by defective products. It errs in finding liability without fault
an appropriate measure, let alone the "sole means" to the end of pay-
ing for product injury. Even with "fault" postulated away, the pri-
vate-law litigant faces barriers (in the U.S. and more so in Europe)
that keep her out of court, and even unaware of her claim. Some kind
of welfare system is the only way to express a meaningful commit-
ment to compensation. Although the Directive does not call for
health-care reductions, its timing coincides with these calls. A new
reliance on tort liability for compensation would hurt Europeans.
b. The Safety Rationale
In the years before promulgation of the Directive, American writ-
ers became interested in the question of whether the shift from negli-
gence to strict liability for product-related injuries had enhanced
safety. A theoretical model of strict products liability won the
approval of economic analysts in the 1970s. They maintained that a
strict liability rule was as amenable as negligence to the task of bring-
ing the accident rate to an efficient level.' 17 Some writers, both econo-
116. See Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 785, 796 (1990). For elaboration on
the poor fit between liability and compensation, see E. Bernzweig, By Accident Not Design:
The Case for Comprehensive Injury Reparations (1980); Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform,
24 San Diego L. Rev. 795 (1987).
117. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 92-95 (1972); Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. Leg. Stud. 1 (1980). The theoretical model diverges from strict products
liability as it is applied. Because the model requires an effective defense of contributory
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mists and noneconomists, made normative arguments for the
expansion of a producer's liability. 118 These arguments reinforced a
view that strict products liability ought to increase safety: when man-
ufacturers pay for a greater share of the costs of accidents, they will
invest in measures that make products safer.
Whether United States' strict liability has indeed resulted in safer
products and fewer accidents is a subject of disagreement. An empiri-
cal study reports, on the one hand, several declines: in the accidental
death rate, the rate of accidental deaths at home, and the rate of inju-
ries on the job, all in the last three decades. 1 9 On the other hand, a
product-by-product breakdown of workplace injuries shows an
increase in the rate of injury caused by particular products.12 0 It is
undisputed that liability rules have affected the work of manufactur-
ers, who devote more time and resources to questions of safety and
liability. 21 A consumer poll taken in 1987 reports that a majority of
Americans think that product safety and quality has improved in the
past ten years. 22
Thus, recent years have brought increased product safety, but only
to a disputed degree, and not across the board. There are several
explanations for the lack of dramatic benefit. The threat of damages
encourages producers to minimize only the amounts they will have to
pay, not the total accident rate. It would be rational for them to make
greater investments where the user is more likely to sue, and more
likely to prevail. For the liability-lawsuits-safety incentive sequence
to function, victims must sue, and most do not. 23 Strict products
negligence (to impose incentives of care on the consumer) and because strict products liability
developed into a rough equivalent to negligence for many situations, see Birnbaum, supra note
88, at 601, economic analysts have revisited their claim that strict products liability is efficient.
See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 160-64 (3d ed. 1986); Landes & Posner, A Positive
Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. Legal Stud. 535, 537-543 (1985).
118. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Towards a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L.J.
1055 (1972); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function
and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1109 (1974).
119. See Consumer Federation of America, The Benefits of the Modernization of the Tort
Law in the Context of the Social Movement for Improved Safety and Quality in the National
Economy 14-18 (1987) [hereinafter Consumer Federation].
120. See Priest, supra note 69, at 192. Priest also reports an increase in the total number of
product-related injuries requiring hospital treatment, id. at 192, but does not account for the
increase in population and increased distribution of products. Another difficulty with the data
is that they do not distinguish between defective and nondefective products: accidents
involving persons who stood on the top step of a ladder, for instance, are not excluded.
121. See Weber, Product Liability: The Corporate Response, 893 Conference Bd. Res. Rep.
21, 21-22 (1987); Consumer Federation, supra note 119, at 3-6, 10.
122. Id. at 11.
123. See Abel, supra note 116, at 809-810, 814.
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liability precludes a defense based on breach of duty but not on causa-
tion, and therefore producers can shift their resources (generally
greater than those of a plaintiff) toward a challenge of causation.1 24
Strict liability may land hardest on new technologies and unfamiliar
products, even when they are safe, or safer than substitutes.' 25 Orga-
nizational anomalies, employee ignorance and incompetence, small
penalties and most of all liability insurance all combine to reduce the
responsiveness of manufacturers to the effects of expanded liability.1 26
It has also been suggested that expanded liability may reduce con-
sumer safety conscientiousness.1 27
A review of the United States record and related literature ought to
have suggested to the Commission that although safety was enhanced
during the strict liability era, this progress cannot be linked to a
change in doctrine. Too many gaps separate each change that is con-
nected ultimately to safety. Error, helplessness and perverse incen-
tives break the links. These gaps become even more significant in a
system where litigation is rare and risky for a plaintiff. Liberal doc-
trine means little to a victim who will not or cannot sue.
The relationship of incentives to safety is real, however, as is the
overall increase in safety in the United States. Credit for the pressure
of incentive goes to the consumer movement. Consumerism
expressed through doctrine, rather than doctrine itself, imposed
incentives toward safety on U.S. manufacturers. A similar ground-
swell has existed and continues to exist in the Community, but tradi-
tion suggests that it will choose expression through means other than
litigation. 128
C. Approximation
Approximation, like harmonization, is a term of some ambiguity. ' 29
To this native speaker of English, it implies replication. Although
some EC source material regards the two words as synonyms, this
Article uses "approximation" to convey replication or reconciliation.
A directive promulgated to create approximation would contain the
124. See Glenn, Judicial Authority and the Liability of the Manufacturer, or Jusqu'ou Peut-
on Aller Trop Loin?, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 555, 558 (1990).
125. See P. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and its Consequences 155-61 (1988).
126. See Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 555, 564-73 (1985).
127. See W.K. Viscusi, Regulating Consumer Product Safety 7 (1984) (noting that
"compensation should depend on consumers' safety-related actions"). But see Latin, Problem-
Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 677, 680 (1985) (disputing
Viscusi argument).
128. See section III (Conclusion).
129. See supra note 21.
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terms common to all of the laws of Member States, and where the
laws diverged it would find a middle ground. A look at the Directive,
however, reveals that it does not parallel the various national prod-
ucts liability laws. While most of the people of the European Com-
munity, and the majority of the twelve nations, live under legal
systems where negligence and warranty govern products liability
law, 130 the Directive provides for "liability without fault on the part
of the producer."13
This statement contains some drama. When the Council declared
that liability "without fault on the part of the producer is the sole
means of adequately solving the problem, peculiar to our age of
increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment of the risks inherent in
modern technological production,"1 32 it echoed what Gary Schwartz
has called "genuine strict liability."1 33 By accepting liability "without
fault" and its social justification, the Council also adopted two dis-
tinct constituents of strict products liability: a change in the plain-
tiff's requirements of proof, and a loss-spreading rationale. Although
the Council went on to retreat from this bold step by favoring defect-
based strict liability, the statement of motive has remained.
To understand the application of strict products liability in the
European Community, and why the Directive does not achieve har-
monization in the sense of approximation, it is crucial to separate the
loss-spreading rationale from the question of proof. As discussed
below, burdens of proof have long been flexible in Europe. The
endorsement of loss spreading, however, is new to the Community.
In its Preamble, the Directive declares that only expanded liability
can allocate risks fairly between producers and consumers. 134 Thus,
even if, as many have said, strict products liability and negligence
rules generally lead to the same outcome when cases are decided, 13 5
the Directive changes rather than approximates European products
liability law.' 36 This change clashes with a long European tradition of
130. See supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
131. Directive, supra note 2, at Preamble.
132. Id. The Preamble to a directive is not merely introductory material: it is mandated by
the Treaty of Rome as a statement of motive. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 190.
133. Genuine strict liability, as defined by Professor Schwartz, is a rule that would make
manufacturers liable for all accidents "caused or occasioned by their products." Schwartz,
supra note 88, at 441. With no mention of the word defect, the Preamble apparently embraces
this definition.
134. See Directive, supra note 2, at Preamble.
135. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 145-160. One comment suggests that although the
doctrinal change of the Directive will be slight, implementation may have "psychological
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manipulating existing contract and tort principles to provide legal
redress for plaintiffs injured by defective products, and of compensat-
ing injured persons through social-welfare spending.
1. The Past: Fault, Negligence, and Warranty
A civil law heritage, which influences all of the EC including its
two common law countries, has embedded the fault principle in the
European laws of obligation. Product liability rules come from both
contract and tort precedents, 37 as in the common law. Under Roman
contract law, obligation was based on consent (pacta sunt servanda);
in the case of extra-contractual liability, the basis of liability was the
fault of the actor. 138  This principle of individual responsibility
remained constant in European codifications, most prominently the
French Civil Code of 1804, that brought civil law into the modem
era.
1 39
As interpreted for many years in the United States and the United
Kingdom, the laws of contractual and extra-contractual liability
posed doctrinal obstacles to consumers who alleged that they were
injured by a product. The rule of privity blocked recovery by persons
who had not entered into a contract with the manufacturer. Tort law,
which was later permitted as a basis of recovery, required the proof of
negligence.'40 United States courts eventually saved plaintiffs from
their plight with strict products liability. On the Continent, however,
courts construed their old laws of obligation to cover product-caused
injuries.
Contract law evolved early. Long before Cardozo decided to reject
contract principles that purported to limit actions for injury caused by
defective products, 4' French jurists understood the connection
between fault and the sale of defective goods. Venerable French stat-
utes provide that a seller warrants a chattel to be free of latent defects
consequences ... specifically a probable increase in plaintiff's expectations regarding damage
awards and the effects of these expectations on developments in future case law." See Tocpke
& Hassels-Weiler, 1992 and the Approximation of Product Liability Law: the Implementation
of the EC Council Directive on Product Liability, and its Effects in Germany and other EC
Countries, in European Economic Community, supra note 76, at 137-38.
137. The law of Europe derives from a tradition linked back to Roman codification in 450
B.C. See J. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition 2 (2d ed. 1985).
138. See Yntema, The Law of Obligations, in Civil Law in the Modern World 68 (A.
Yiannapoulos ed. 1965).
139. See, e.g., Code Civil [hereinafter C. Civ.] art. 1382 (Fr.) (tort law); Burgerliches
Gesetzbuch [BGB] art. 242 (W. Ger.) (contract).
140. See E. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 9-27 (1949).
141. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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that make the chattel unfit for its intended use.'42 The seller who
knows of a defect is responsible for all damage; the good-faith, igno-
rant seller is responsible only for economic loss.' 43 French courts
have long interpreted this law to hold even the ignorant seller respon-
sible for all injury.' 44 Privity, another key element of civil-law con-
tracts doctrine, was also interpreted in France to allow lawsuits by a
consumer against a manufacturer.'45
French law drew a similar connection between past and present.
The principle offait de la chose, approved by the Court of Cassation
in 1897,146a time when the citadel of privity stood firm in the U.S. and
the United Kingdom, created a presumption of liability for the "act"
done by things in one's charge.'4 7 Like traditional strict liability in
Anglo-American law, fait de la chose linked harm to the lapse of an
individual. 14
European courts have also revised burdens of proof. When viewed
flexibly, the fault principle need not dictate more than some showing
by a plaintiff that the defendant's actions caused injury. Judges in
some EC countries have found liability under a fault principle when
the particular harmful occurrence could reasonably have been pre-
vented by a safer design, better instructions, or more care in manufac-
142. C. Civ., arts. 1641-43.
143. Id., arts. 1645-46.
144. This construction has been traced back to Celsius, who had equated lack of
professional skill and knowledge with fault, and was endorsed by the creators of the Civil
Code. H. Tebbens, International Product Liability 84-85 (1979) (citing J. Domat, The Civil
Law in its Natural Order, I. II. XI.VII. (1737)).
145. Id. at 87.
146. See Yntema, supra note 138, at 69-70.
147. French judges derivedfait de la chose from ancient rules, recodified in the Civil Code,
about responsibility for damage caused by an animal. Id. at 70. The story offait de la chose is
a neat civil law parallel to Levi's legal process narrative. See E. Levi, supra note 140. It
partially refutes the notion that doctrinal change through reasoning is a phenomenon that
distinguishes the common law. See also 11 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law
23-28 (1983).
148. Both traditional and modern strict liability refer to liability for accidental harm based
on the unusual nature of a hazard rather than negligent conduct. See Restatement (2d) of
Torts § 519 comment d (1977); Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H. & C. 774 (1865), L.R. 1 Exch. 265
(1866), L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). Under strict liability, an actor who has created a risk in excess
of what her community tolerates is held responsible for resultant harm. See Fletcher, Fairness
and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1972) (paradigm of reciprocal risks).
Although strict liability relaxes the fault requirement, activity by an individual is still the basis
of liability. See Golden v. Amory, 329 Mass. 484, 109 N.E. 2d 131 (Mass. 1952) (no strict
liability for unforeseeable act of God). Compare Noble v. Yorke, 490 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1986)
(strict liability based on owner's knowledge of vicious propensity of dog) with Rolen v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 240 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 1970) (no strict liability because owner's
knowledge of vicious propensity not shown).
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ture. 49 Of the EC countries, France has altered the burden of proof
most in favor of plaintiffs, with Luxembourg following closely and
Belgium accepting a slightly moderated form of French innovation. t'I
France now permits users not in privity to recover, with relative
ease, in tort. The courts have held that the same condition of a prod-
uct which would give rise to liability by a seller to a buyer constitutes
fault in regard to third persons.'51 Liability forfait de la chose, which
the Code Napoleon imposes on the keeper of a thing, seems on its face
to attribute responsibility only to an owner.15 2  But substantial
authority now distinguishes garde du comportement, the control exer-
cised by an owner or carrier, and garde de la structure, control of the
internal dynamism, finding the latter control to be a basis of liabil-
ity.15 3 Supported by these two concepts, a French plaintiff need prove
only a defect causally linked to injury. In virtually all cases, this
proof constitutes an irrebuttable presumption of fault. t '
Other EC countries observe the fault principle more closely. In
Germany and the United Kingdom the plaintiff must prove that a
manufacturer failed to exercise due care, and that this failure resulted
in a defect that caused injury.1 5 5 This requirement is interpreted to
mean that once the plaintiff proves a defect, the manufacturer must
prove that it exercised reasonable care.1 56 To this end, Germany uses
a rebuttable presumption of fault upon the showing of defect; 157 the
U.K. reaches a similar result with its common-law reliance on res ipsa
loquitur.'5 1 Unlike their counterparts in France, producers in Ger-
many and the United Kingdom can rebut the presumption against
149. See H. Tebbens, supra note 144, at 84 n.16.
150. See Orban, supra note 11, at 350.
151. See id.
152. See S. Gruber-Magitot, LAction du Consummateur Contre le Fabricant d'un Objet
AffectE par un Vice Cach6 98-99 (1978).
153. Id. at 100.
154. See Whincup, supra note 56, at 530-31. A Belgian plaintiff is similarly favored, except
that in contract lawsuits the presumption of fault by the seller or producer is rebuttable, and
the courts uphold some exculpatory agreements and disclaimers of liability. See Orban, supra
note 11, at 350.
155. Id. at 354, 362. In addition, plaintiffs in Germany may sue in contract and tort law
simultaneously, unlike plaintiffs in France or Belgium. Id. at 351.
156. Id.
157. Judgment of Nov. 26, 1968, Bundesgerichtshof [1969], Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
269, 274.
158. Orban, supra note 11, at 361. It has been widely noted that res ipsa loquitur parallels
the rebuttable presumption of negligence. One distinction between the two is that courts may
use res ipsa loquitur as a permissible inference of negligence, rather than impose a duty to
rebut. See P. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of
Torts 257-59 (5th ed. 1984).
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them.' 59 Ireland, the Netherlands, and Denmark follow a similar
rule. '60
European law, in sum, has kept constant the theme of individual
dereliction in its laws of obligation, preferring ingenuity likefait de la
chose, reinterpretation of contracts, and new presumptions to the
sweeping concession that marks strict products liability. Clinging to
fault and contract may seem artificial; the promulgators of the Direc-
tive clearly favored casting this tradition aside. Connecting injury to
individual fault or consent has, however, demonstrated virtues. The
connection made reform acceptable for centuries; it bends flexibly,
and, as interpreted on the Continent, it has earned the consent of citi-
zens who live with it under democratic governments.
2. Strict Products Liability. A Trend?
One way to save the approximation definition of harmonization is
to say that although this history does respect the fault principle, strict
products liability is a trend throughout Europe. Some proponents of
the Directive have tried this argument. 161 Old statutes say fault and
contract; more and more often the judges who construe them find that
manufacturers are liable for injuries caused by defective products.
The obvious response to the claim is that if "trend" means anything
like a recent tendency, it could not be applied to the movement of
several European nations toward flexibility. French jurists took a
broad view of liability in the eighteenth century, reinterpreted fault
and contract in the nineteenth, and made presumptions of fault virtu-
ally irrebuttable in the twentieth. 62 The German supreme court for-
mally shifted the burden of proof for products liability actions in
1968. Res ipsa loquitur has been softening British rules of proof for
more than a hundred years.' 63
Trend theorists make the additional, and perhaps more important,
mistake of failing to identify precisely what change they contend took
place. It is probably true that, in general, a European plaintiff
prevails more easily now in products liability litigation than at some
159. Orban, supra note 11, at 354, 364.
160. See Taschner, supra note 12, at 84. The remaining nations keep a traditional approach
to the burden of proof, requiring plaintiffs to prove a failure to exercise due care, in which
failure is not inferred from the presence of a defect.
161. See Boger, The Harmonization of European Products Liability Law, 7 Fordham Int'l
L.J. 1, 21, 35 (1984); H. Tebbens, supra note 144, at 115 (finding trend toward strict liability
shared among various legal systems, though not proceeding at same rate); see also Virginia
Note, supra note 3, at 735-36 (alluding to, but not endorsing, trend theory).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 141-48, 151-54.
163. See Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch. Ch. 1863).
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date in the past. The evidence for this change is skimpy and anecdo-
tal, especially because "products liability" still sounds unfamiliar to
European (except German) ears and does not appear in most Euro-
pean codes, pleadings or captions. 1 "6
But this change, if it exists, demonstrates only a shift in attitude
toward consumers that has loosened burdens of proof. Having
decided to treat the class of plaintiffs more leniently, European judges
appear to have followed the European tradition of adjusting the bur-
den of proof to facilitate litigation. The trend toward easing the bur-
den of proof is different from a trend toward loss spreading, the
second constituent of strict products liability as expressed in the Pre-
amble of the Directive. The Directive explicitly changes the burden
of proof and announces its intent to reallocate risk and loss. In order
for a trend theory to explain the Directive as approximation and not
law reform, there must have been a trend in Europe not only toward
more plaintiffs' victories but also a clear endorsement of loss spread-
ing. Trend theorists who defend the Directive only with reference to
the former event are underdescribing their document.
Thus, the case for a trend requires specific instances of the adoption
of strict products liability with a clear endorsement of loss spreading.
In making their claim, proponents rely on only one statute: the Phar-
maceutical Act of 1976,165 a West German law created expressly to
reallocate the cost of drug-caused injury.1 66 The Pharmaceutical Act
makes its commitment to loss spreading clear by not excluding devel-
opment risks167
164. Will, Asides on the Nonharmonization of Products Liability Laws in Europe, in
Harmonization of Laws in the European Communities: Products Liability, Conflict or Laws
and Corporation Law 29 (1983). To create products liability law, judges have adapted
principles of tort and contract. In civil law countries judge-made law is of uncertain
precedential effect- principles become binding when they attain general acceptance. See
Orban, supra note 11, at 349. This custom exacerbates the difficulty of identifying
nonstatutory change in the law.
165. The Revised Pharmaceutical Act of 1976 (Arzneimittelgesetz) Aug. 24, 1976,
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGB]I 2445 (V. Ger.).
166. The Act was passed in the wake of the Thalidomide disaster. See Boger, supra note
161, at 13, Virginia Note, supra note 3, at 762 n.184. See generally Mellin & Katzenstein, The
Saga of Thalidomide (pts. 1 & 2), 267 N. Eng. J. Med. 1184, 1238 (1962) (teratogenic effect of
drug).
167. Key provisions of the Act include a cap on liability (US 5327,000 per plaintiff; S110
million overall, or $7.9 million a year, for each producer per drug), a negligence standard for
warning claims, a risk/utility mechanism to determine whether a particular injury is
actionable, and a mandatory insurance plan. Pharmaceutical Act, supra note 165, at arts. 88,
84, 94. The monetary limits are converted based on an exchange rate of 1.6946DM to US SI,
the rate current as of October 11, 1991.
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But the Directive and the Act have little in common. 16 The funda-
mental difference between the statutes lies in their ambition. Aimed
narrowly at a particular industry, the Pharmaceutical Act addresses a
particular historical event. Pharmaceutical injury raises unique
problems of causation, loss spreading, insurance and support of inno-
vation: these injuries represent an advanced problem of products lia-
bility. It is not a coincidence that the United States and Germany, the
countries most preoccupied with products liability as a doctrine, have
isolated pharmaceutical injury by statute. Just as the National Child-
hood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986169 is sui generis in the United States,
and presaged no trend,17 the German compensation scheme marked
no transformation in Europe, a conclusion mandated by the absence
of similar statutes in the years 1976 to 1985.
3. Whither Approximation?
The approximation definition of harmonization thus fails to
describe the basis for the Directive. Because the nations of Europe
had declined to instill loss spreading in their products liability rules,
the loss-spreading Directive does not approximate or reconcile
existing law. A putative movement toward allowing plaintiffs to
recover more easily is not the same thing as a trend toward loss
spreading, and so a trend theory cannot support a characterization of
the Directive as approximating national laws.
Approximation could have been tried. An approximation-based
directive would provide that when a plaintiff can prove the existence
of a defect in the product that impaired her, the manufacturer must
prove that it exercised reasonable care. This rule, a rebuttable pre-
sumption of negligence, is the pre-Directive law of a plurality of EC
nations (Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland,
and Denmark), as well as the pre-Directive law of a majority of the
EC population. 171 As in the present Directive, under an approxima-
tionist directive the plaintiff would have the burden of proving a
defect, causation, and damage. 172 Midway between the French hard-
168. As Stapleton points out, the peril that the Pharmaceutical Act addresses, widespread
consumption of a drug with disastrous effects unknowable at the time of circulation, cannot be
covered by the Directive, which makes the development risks defense optional. See Stapleton,
supra note 3, at 421-22.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 to -33 (West Supp. 1987).
170. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc
Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 387 (1987).
171. See supra text at section I(C)(1).
172. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 4.
[Vol. 31:673
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN EC
to-rebut presumption of negligence and the traditional burden on
plaintiffs, this standard would have given Member States some direc-
tion from above but would, again like the Directive, impose nothing
on individual cases that would change their outcome. In addition to
being clearer, more consistent with European tradition, less enamored
of a flawed American precedent, and more prudent than the Direc-
tive, such a measure would have been more likely to succeed.
The next section describes the difficult path of the Directive and
attributes its problems to its content. Excessive ambition in the direc-
tion of law reform pulled the Directive to the boundary of lawfulness
under the Treaty of Rome. Ultimately, the Community had to aban-
don this ambition and live with a Directive that does less for eco-
nomic and social progress than an approximationist directive would
have accomplished.
II. JURISDICTION
As has been mentioned above, the Directive is part of a larger con-
sumer protection effort. In 1969, the European Parliament adopted a
report that argued for a stronger position of consumers in the Com-
munity.173 Strict products liability was slated for early action. t74 Five
years later, the Commission promulgated the Directive pursuant to
the official consumer protection program. 175 For the Directive to rest
on a solid jurisdictional basis, the official consumer protection pro-
gram must have fallen within the scope of article 100 of the Treaty of
Rome.
The question of whether it does fall within this provision is com-
plex. Commentators and the European Court of Justice agree that
the Treaty of Rome is a flexible instrument, 76 but whether this flexi-
bility extends to article 100, the provision governing directives,
173. See 12 O.J. Eur. Comm. 69 (1969) (189/68, OJC 17/69).
174. See Dashwood, supra note 21, at 202.
175. See Council resolution of 14 April 1975 on a preliminary programme of the European
Economic Community for a consumer protection and information policy, 18 O.J. Eur. Comm.
(No. C 92) 1 (1975) (Council resolution on consumer protection and information); Council
Directive of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, 28 O.J. Eur.
Comm. 133 (1985) (update of prior resolution).
176. Broad powers emanate from its Preamble. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1. The
Treaty also provides for the nullification of obstructionist national laws or conduct. See id..
art. 100 (approving issuance of directives); art. 170 (the power of Member States to bring
proceedings against another Member State before the Court of Justice following Commission
review of alleged infringement); art. 171 (compelling Member States to comply with decisions
of Court of Justice). One important article, analogous to the "necessary and proper" clause of
the United States Constitution, provides that the Council may act to attain any "one of the
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remains unanswered. Article 100 provides that "[t]he Council shall,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, issue direc-
tives for the approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regu-
lation or administrative action in Member States as directly affect the
establishment or functioning of the common market."177 Directives
issued pursuant to article 100, which bind sovereigns, 17 must bear
some relationship to the purposes of the Treaty. Beyond this basic
agreement, however, the views regarding the scope of article 100
diverge. 179
Depending on the interpretation of article 100, then, the consumer
protection program may or may not rest on faulty jurisdictional
grounds. A rickety, but perhaps sufficient, argument may be made
that the Treaty of Rome endorses consumerism. The Treaty was
designed to promote the constant improvement of living and working
conditions.18 0 Various articles in the Treaty endorse promotion of a
higher standard of living,181 policies that would tend to stabilize
prices for agricultural goods, 8 2 and the goal of eliminating unfair
trade practices."8 3 Parliament, an institution that has expressed
doubts over the jurisdictional basis of the Directive, has found that
consumerism is pervasive in the penumbras of the Treaty of Rome.184
In this conflict, a Joose definition of "consumerism" is necessary.
Strict products liability endorses loss spreading, may tend to
encourage consumer lawsuits, and may ease the burden of proof on
plaintiffs. Thus, under the consumerist justification, the Community
should prefer strict liability to fault-based liability. Consumerism is
an ideal that nations can either reject or accept in their products lia-
bility laws merely by describing them as fault-based or strict. More
and stricter strict liability equals more consumerism. The refusal of
objectives of the Community" when the Treaty has not provided the necessary powers. Id. art.
235.
177. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 100 (emphasis added).
178. Id. art. 189.
179. See Close, The Legal Basis for the Consumer Protection Programme of the EEC and
Priorities for Action, 8 Eur. L. Rev. 221, 232 (1983). Close discusses three possible
approaches to interpreting the jurisdictional basis for the consumer protection programs. Id.
at 222-26. In addition, Close presents a spectrum representing the "degree of connection"
between proposals and the goals of the Common Market. Id. at 231-35.
180. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, Preamble.
181. Id. Preamble and art. 2; Directorate General, supra note 44, at 1.
182. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, arts. 3, 39.
183. Id. arts. 3, 85-94.
184. According to a candid Parliament report, "the EEC Treaty makes no provision for a
common consumer policy." Directorate General, supra note 44, at 1.
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countries like Germany to adopt de jure strict products liability,"8 5
and the even more grievous refusal of countries like Italy to adopt de
facto strict products liability,' 86 interfere with a norm of the Common
Market.
This part offers two responses to the use of consumerism to justify
promulgation of the Directive. First, arguments that the Directive is
ultra vires, raised in 1978, were never refuted and continue to have
merit. Second, resistance to the Directive within the EC nations is of
jurisdictional significance.
A. Article 100 Broadly Interpreted
When asked its opinion of the first products liability directive, the
1976 version, the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parlia-
ment declared it ultra vires. The Committee read the phrase "as
directly affect ' 187 in article 100 to mean that proponents of a directive
have the burden of showing that divergences among national laws
have caused a malfunctioning of the Common Market, and that the
Directive would cure that malfunctioning.' 8 The proponents of the
1976 Directive did not meet this burden. Two of the three formal
justifications included in the Directive, "divergencies may distort
competition," and "the free movement of goods within the common
market may be influenced by divergencies in law"'189 were speculative.
According to its report, when the Legal Affairs Committee turned to
"the relevant Commission department" for factual support for these
conjectures it received an inadequate response.' 90 The third justifica-
tion, consumer protection, lacked a sufficient basis in the Treaty of
Rome, according to the Committee.191
But the Committee wavered. Although it declared that "[flor the
Article to apply, it is essential for there to be an immediate causal link
between (the divergencies between) national legislation and the
(mal)functioning of the common market," it then continued, "or is it
not sufficient for such an influence to be 'appreciable,' taking a broad
interpretation of the word 'directly'?"' 192
Implicitly accepting a broader interpretation of "directly," the
185. See Thieffry, supra note 3, at 79-80; see also Claveloux, supra note 17.
186. See Thieffry, supra note 3, at 79.
187. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
188. See id.; see also Legal Affairs, supra note 48, at 8.
189. Id. (quoting 1976 Directive, supra note 23, Preamble) (emphasis in original).
190. Id. at 9.
191. Id. at 11.
192. Id. at 8.
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Committee went on to stray from its jurisdictional complaint and
reach the merits. The Committee explained that even if the phrase
"as directly affect" is so broad as to mean nothing, the 1976 Directive
ought not to be approved by the Council. There were too many flaws.
The Directive would not completely replace all the national laws and
hence could not create uniformity; it would impose heavy costs on
industry; and it would injure competitiveness in the world market. 193
Debate over the merits of the Directive came to overshadow the
ultra vires objection. Once compromises were in place in the 1985
version, particularly a development risks defense, subject to abroga-
tion, close reading of article 100 vanished. Proponents of the Direc-
tive continued to intone that divergent liability rules meant divergent
costs of doing business, which meant divergences in the functioning of
the Common Market. From 1978 to the present, no EC institution
has complained that this chain of reasoning is insufficient to support
the Directive.
The old ultra vires objection, however, remains convincing, because
proponents of the Directive failed to support their conjecture that
divergent products liability laws affected competition and the move-
ment of goods. 194 Even if "as directly affect" means "very indirectly
affect," the proponents of the Directive suggested nothing more than
possibilities. All that might survive from their defense is the claim of
consumer protection, whose jurisdictional status is unclear. The
reluctance of the Legal Affairs Committee clearly to resolve the juris-
dictional problem, coupled with the proponents' inability to demon-
strate the truth of their assertions, keeps the ultra vires objection alive.
B. Resistance
An evaluation of the jurisdictional basis of any directive is informed
by the dynamic span of time between a directive's promulgation and
implementation. The debates at the national level over implementa-
tion are relevant to determining the effect of a directive on the harmo-
nization of the Common Market.
The story of the Directive is the story of two rejections. Its original
incarnation, the 1976 Directive, failed at the Council level and had to
be softened, if not eviscerated, by formal compromise. The present
version, although adopted by delegates from all the EC nations in a
unanimous vote, faltered at the national level; nine of the twelve
nations did not meet the three-year deadline for implementation.
193. Id. at 11-12.
194. See text infra section I(B)(1)(a).
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1. Resistance in 1976
The European Commission presented the 1976 Directive to the
Council in October 1976. In accordance with procedure, the Direc-
five had to be considered by the European Parliament and the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee before the Council could make its
decision. 195 Although neither group can issue binding advice, 196 in
practice the Council usually heeds their views.' 97 Voices of industry
speaking to the two groups criticized the Directive.198  The European
Parliament initially deemed the 1976 Directive ultra vires and later
suggested a version of the development risks defense that was eventu-
ally included in the final 1985 version. Parliament also suggested sev-
eral other measures designed to restrict the liability of producers.199
For its part, the Economic and Social Committee approved liability
irrespective of fault but failed to agree on a development risks defense
or a cap on damages.2°° Both reports made the development risks
defense their pivotal criticism. But for several years the Commission
stood firm: consumerism mandated the strict liability of the producer
for unknown development risks.20'
With consensus mandated by the unanimity rule of article 100, the
Council referred this conflict to its Permanent Representatives Com-
mittee, a separate group of ambassadors, with the direction to pro-
mulgate a compromise.2 0 2 In 1982, the Permanent Representatives
195. See supra note 1.
196. Both the Economic and Social Committee-a group of 144 members appointed by
national governments to represent employers, employees, and "public interest coalitions"-
and Parliament have only consultative powers. Id.; see M. Hopkins, Policy Formation in the
European Communities 3 (1981). See also P. Mathijsen, supra note 1, at 95. However, the
Single European Act of 1986 reformed the institutional system of the European Community
and strengthened the position of the European Parliament. Schwartze, The Reform of the
European Community's Institutional System by the Single European Act, in Legislation for
Europe 1992, at 16 (J. Schwartze ed. 1989).
197. See A. Kerr, The Common Market and How It Works 66, 72 (3d ed. 1986).
198. See Virginia Note, supra note 3, at 730 n.5.
199. See Resolution embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the proposal
from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a Directive relating to
the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States
concerning liability for defective products, 22 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. C 127) 61-64 (1979)
(contributory negligence defense, exoneration for producers who inform the public of defects
upon discovery, judicial review of surrounding circumstances when determining whether a
product was defective, intended to narrow permissible interpretation of defect).
200. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Council
Directive relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions
of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, 22 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. C
114) 17-19 (1979).
201. See Virginia Note, supra note 3, at 752-53.
202. See U.S. Experience, supra note 3, at 800. This committee is known as COREPER,
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Committee succeeded in producing the rudiments of an acceptable
compromise. As is reflected in the Directive, all major reforms would
be supplementary. Member States could abrogate the development
risks defense. Caps on damages, also optional, were held to mini-
mums that in practice would provide for virtually unlimited liabil-
ity.20 3 These terms survived and exist in the present Directive. 2°4
2. Resistance to the Compromise Directive of 1985
After promulgation of the Directive, only the United Kingdom,
Greece and Italy complied with the order to adopt statutes incorpo-
rating the directive into their national laws within three years of July
25, 1985. This 25% cooperation rate understates the level of resist-
ance to the Directive: both the British and Italian statutes were
deemed unsatisfactory by the Commission.20 5 Objecting to the word-
ing of the development risks defense in both laws, the Commission
subsequently brought proceedings for nonimplementation against
both countries.20 6 Thus, the number of EC nations that implemented
a timely statute, satisfactory to the Commission, in response to the
Directive is one.20 7
In reviewing the roster of nations that have implemented the Direc-
tive, one is struck by its quality of randomness, not to say dishar-
mony. The list includes large, medium-sized and small countries
whose politics are disparate. Their pre-Directive products liability
laws span the complete EC range, from Luxembourg's virtually
irrebuttable presumption of manufacturer responsibility208 to the ada-
from its French title, Comitg des Representants Permanents. Established in 1958, the
committee functions as a kind of sub-Council, carrying out assigned tasks and doing
preparatory work. Critics feared that COREPER would endanger the Community's
institutional balance by accreting power for the Council at the expense of the Commission; for
a time COREPER was dubbed Stiindige Verrer (Permanent Traitors) by parodists mocking its
German title, Stindige Verrater (Permanent Representatives). The institutional balance
appears to have been preserved. See D. Lasok & J. Bridge, supra note 21, at 200.
203. The COREPER recommendations, though they have been described as a "four-point
solution," see U.S. Experience, supra note 3, at 800, were never official; the Committee works
on an off-the-record basis. The substance of its 1982 compromise was published some months
later in the media specializing in EC affairs. See Virginia Note, supra note 3, at 754 n. 149.
204. Directive, supra note 2, at arts. 15(2) (development risks) and 16 (limitation on
damages).
205. See Thieffry, supra note 3, at 77-79.
206. Id. at 78-9; see also Schneebaum, Products Liability in the European Community:
what does it mean for U.S. Companies?, 44 Food Drug Cosm. L. J. 283, 285 n.14 (1989).
207. Id. at 285 (citing European Comm. Press Release 100 (88) 877 (Dec. 22, 1988)
(announcing Commission's satisfaction with implementation by Greece)).
208. See Whincup, supra note 56, at 530.
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mant fault rule of Italy.2° 9 Only four of the implementing nations
chose not to adopt a cap on liability.210 France, the strict liability
innovator of Europe, has conspicuously not implemented what is uni-
versally known as a strict liability directive.21I No national trait
seems to correlate with the decision to implement the Directive. As
evidenced by the statutes implemented pursuant to the Directive,
divergence continues to exist.
Explanations for this outcome vary. Proponents of the Directive
have claimed that implementation has been accomplished, except for
a few delays that will be temporary. Some writers acknowledge no
resistance, merely the inexperience of "EC bureaucrats ' 21 2 in imple-
menting directives, a need to continue discussion of the problems of
development risks and caps on damages, 1 3 and even a Mediterra-
nean-based tendency to implement measures slowly.214 Other expla-
nations disperse resistance, attributing it to the peculiarities of
individual countries. A British writer describes his country as "a
notoriously difficult Community partner, ' 2 5 and writes that attitudes
toward harmonization in the United Kingdom and Denmark range
"from the politely skeptical to the stridently hostile. ' 216
A plausible reason for delay, however, is that the Directive meta-
morphosed from its controversial stage in 1976 to a version that
seemed empty.217 When consumer advocates and industry could not
reach accord over the substance of the Directive, the Council chose to
209. Id. at 533.
210. Thieffry, supra note 3, at 78-79 (Italy, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and
Denmark).
211. Id. at 79-81.
212. Ludolph, The European Community's 1992 Legislative and Regulatory Process: Rule
Making to Implementation, in European Economic Community, supra note 76, at 25
(discussing transposition of Council directives into national laws by member states.)
213. Scbneebaum, supra note 206, at 284-85.
214. Writing in 1983, Dashwood identified the Mediterranean countries as particularly slow
in the implementation process. See Dashwood, supra note 21, at 206 ("difficulty of achieving
punctual implementation" in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal). Except for Spain, these
countries subsequently defied predictions by implementing the Directive fairly quickly.
215. Id. at 204.
216. Id. at 196. See also Nielsson, supra note 42, at 1594 (Britain, Denmark and Greece are
"the reluctant Europeans who support minimalist approaches based on intergovernmental
cooperation."). Greece, of course, was the least reluctant nation of the Community in
implementing the Directive. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
217. In fairness to those who make excuses for resistance to the Directive, it should be
noted that almost all directives are met with some resistance. A Paris study in 1989 found that
of 279 existing directives, 68 should by then have been implemented, but only seven were
operative in the member nations. Le Monde, Oct. 6, 1989, at 12. But as the Commission
battles indicate, see supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text, the Directive was the subject of
unusually intense resistance.
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compromise by removing most of the substance. The friends and ene-
mies of the 1976 version became neither friends nor enemies of the
Directive. Nothing was at stake."' Without agreement on what a
complying statute ought to say, there could have been no serious dis-
cussion, consensus, or leadership about the Directive in the nations.
A chaotic pattern of implementation resulted.
III. CONCLUSION: SOME LESSONS LEARNED
The Directive has jumped over the hurdles in its path, but over
none of them cleanly. From its inception in the early 1970s, no adver-
sary managed to topple the Directive. Industrial interests could not
silence the strict liability message; close readings of the Treaty of
Rome were abandoned; internal EC machinations did not bring
redrafting and promulgation to a halt; and complete implementation
is probably imminent. Yet each hurdle left its mark, and the Direc-
tive will reach the post-1992 single market with scars.
As this Article has contended, these hurdles may be understood in
terms ofjurisdiction. The elusive concept of harmonization mandated
in article 100 of the Treaty means something more than what von der
Groeben called a mathematical mean,219 yet less than a total rewrit-
ing, of existing laws. Commandments contrary to national traditions
offend the Treaty. But mere reduction to a common denominator
would betray the agreement to advance the welfare of signatory
nations. The Directive properly tried to improve rather than to repli-
cate, and on its face did not exceed the Treaty. Jurisdictional inquiry,
however, continues beyond promulgation. To the EC nations, the
Directive was in 1976 a misguided, Americanish notion; in 1985, a
misguided and neutralized notion. This reception suggests that the
Directive did indeed go beyond the elastic but real boundaries of arti-
cle 100.
Legal-minded perusal of the Directive did not cause resistance:
nothing in the statute reflects a gross departure from the principles
used to decide cases for most people in most EC nations. The resist-
ance can be explained only by the rationale of the Directive: it was
perceived as a reference to the United States and its trope of a liability
crisis. Explicitly stated, strict products liability does not decide cases;
218. For a representative view, see Green & Murphy, Product Liability Law in Ireland, in
European Economic Community, supra note 76, at Ill ("As would be expected, the
manufacturing industry in Ireland has not been pressing for implementation. More
surprisingly, however, no consumer lobby has been very vociferous in calling for the grafting
of this new law onto the Irish Statute Book.").
219. See supra text accompanying note 30.
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it stands for an endorsement of the lawsuit. To Europeans, who have
never solved social problems by litigation, strict products liability is a
cure for American lapses, and one that has caused harm.
Better cures exist. Affluent nations in Europe have done better
than the United States with standards and regulations,2 0 and the
Community ought to accomplish its consumerist goals with them.
These devices have long been acceptable to Europeans. Although no
single proposed standard is without some critic, the Member States
and their citizens accept the need that a word, a product or a descrip-
tion mean the same thing throughout the Community. 21
But as an aspiration, consumerism cannot be commanded entirely
by centralized regulations: the directive remains an important
device.222 Directives aim to effect a particular result, giving Member
States some detail but leaving room for variance. The task of ensur-
ing or expanding consumer protection is mostly practical. Use of a
directive rather than a series of regulations adds idealism to the work.
The EC Product Safety Directive,2 3 promulgated in 1989,
describes its purpose as an attempt to create a "general safety require-
ment." The requirement is that products "do not present unaccept-
able risks and that potential users are warned of any remaining
risks." 224 Continuing beyond this generalization, the Safety Directive
mandates the creation of a well-funded and well-informed regulatory
sector in each country, data collection to determine potential hazards
to safety and centralized reporting to the Commission225provisions
220. See Quigley, EC Law: Litigation and the Environment, in European Community,
supra note 76, at 285, 292 (unlike directives, regulations are automatically legally binding on
EC nations).
221. According to Close's spectrum, "negative harmonization," the most permissible
change, refers to the nullification of national laws incompatible with the Treaty of Rome. See
Close, supra note 179, at 231. A synonym is "liberalization," meaning "the removal of
obstacles to freedom of movement between the member states." Dashwood, supra note 21, at
182; see also supra note 37. The other end of the spectrum, the least permissible, consists of
what Close calls "no hopers." Near "negative harmonization" are measures that directly
affect the functioning of the Common Market; near "no hopers" are "measures for which [the
Treaty of Rome] can be used as a legal basis." Close, supra note 179, at 232. Regulations and
standards fit into the Close category of a "direct effect," perhaps even closer than that category
to "negative harmonization," whereas the Directive fits the more distant category of measures
that can (but might not) be justified by article 235.
222. Although the Council can choose flexibly between regulations and directives, among
other measures (both binding and nonbinding), the regulation has been used sparingly. It
addresses subjects that EC institutions control directly. Agriculture and trade regulation are
the areas where the Council generally uses the regulation. See Quigley, supra note 220, at 292.
223. 32 0.. Eur. Comm. (No. C 193) 1 (1989) [hereinafter Safety Directive].
224. Id. at Preamble.
225. Id. at art. 7. Other duties mandated in this article include assuring the competence of
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that demonstrate at least an attempt to learn from American mistakes
in regulation.
All of the Safety Directive bears evidence of hard thought. Facing
the need to promote consumerism while believing that too much of it
can lead to crisis, the Safety Directive reconceptualizes consumerism.
According to the Safety Directive, consumerism stands for safety.
The "fairness" justification of the Directive226 had previously been
interpreted as a euphemism for bias, or at least the correction of an
imbalance, thereby opening a winner-take-all conflict: whom would
the Directive favor? By contrast, the Safety Directive casts product
safety as in the mutual interests of industry and consumers: at last a
harmonization of economic progress and social progress.
The Safety Directive does not preclude liability reform, not even
the attempt at reform made in the Directive.227 Rather it facilitates
such reform. By empowering national regulators to collect data228 as
well as promulgate uniform safety rules, 229 it can help to identify
sources of danger: a particularly hazardous product, or a tendency of
consumers to misuse a product, may call for special liability rules.
Directive 85/374 has ignored the crucial subject of the duty to
warn;2 3 article 4(1) of the Safety Directive contributes a helpful
description of a good warning, specific yet not rigid, that would aid a
judge trying to determine the reasonableness of a producer's con-
duct.231 Unlike Directive 85/374, the Safety Directive avoids the con-
regulators (art. 7(I)(b)) and attention to consumer complaints (art. 7(l)(e)). The Safety
Directive expressly prohibits national governments from limiting regulators' duties to
compliance with regulations. Id. at art. 7(l)(B), 7(l)(e).
226. Directive, supra note 2, at Preamble.
227. See Safety Directive, supra note 223, at art. 16 (Safety Directive "shall be without
prejudice to Directive 85/374/EEC").
228. Id. at art. 7(l)(d).
229. Id. at art. 7(2).
230. The only reference to warning in the Directive is the statement that "presentation" of
the product bears on the question of whether it is "defective." See Directive, supra note 2, art.
6(l)(a). Warning law smacks of negligence, of course, and the authors of the Directive were
apparently averse to negligence. Again, American experience bears on the task of the
Commission. Strict products liability must confront the problem of the useful though risky
product, where neither elimination of the hazard nor complete exoneration of producers is as
good a solution as a warning. This dilemma calls for human judgment, and mandates a
negligence-like standard.
231. The Safety Directive divides risks into "unacceptable" and "acceptable" categories,
and article 4 addresses the acceptable risks. Such a risk must be "appropriately indicated" by
a warning that takes into account "the intended use, consumption, packaging, transport and
stage of a product." Safety Directive, supra note 223, art. 4(l)(a). The warning must be
readily perceived at any necessary stage. Id. at 4(l)(b). The risk must be apparent to the user
before he encounters the product, so that he can make "his own assessment of the risk." Id. at
(4)(2). These rules are written as minimal standards.
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cept of "defect," having learned from American experience that the
label is misleading.232 "Safe product" may prove no better. Neither
term answers the inquiry. Safe product is a clearer concept than free-
dom from defect, however, at least in situations where a product
design has been challenged. 23 3 Reasonableness, ever-present in any
assessment of risks and injury, is inherent in "safe product," whereas
"defect" does not eliminate the trivial. At a minimum, the Safety
Directive has chosen a term free from bad American history.
The reconciliation that the Safety Directive offers can be under-
stood only in its context of an extra-legal approach to social welfare.
Thus, this point is confined to Europe, as it has minimal application
to the United States. Tort reform writers in the U.S. who would trans-
fer authority for product safety and liability to professional adminis-
trators234 must overlook the American history of captured regulators,
low fines, dismantling of agencies and other evidence of weakness in
regulatory structure.235
The crucial distinction between American and European safety
reforms is the large gap between administrative penalties and litiga-
tion judgments in the United States. A $2,000,000 fine was the largest
one levied based on the sale of a product in the U.S. 36 Jury verdicts,
some of which are upheld, frequently exceed that amount.2 Ameri-
can regulation fulfills a function different from the tort system not
only in kind but in degree. Low jury awards and less inclination to
sue mean that manipulation of the regulatory system in Europe offers
more promise than this manipulation could at present deliver in the
United States.
The European grasp of what regulation can offer is clearer than the
Community's understanding of consumerism. To the European Par-
liament, consumerism means respect for the buyer and user of prod-
ucts and services. The consumer is "involved in those aspects of life
232. See supra note 88.
233. For discussion of the conceptual flaws of "design defect" as a cause of action, see
Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of
Adjudication, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531 (1973).
234. See P. Huber, supra note 125, at 214-15.
235. See Schwartz, A Product Safety Agenda for the 1990s, 45 Wash. & Lee L Rev. 1355,
1368 (1988); S. Tolchin & M. Tolchin, Dismantling America: The Rush to Deregulate 96
(1983). See also Priest, supra note 69, at 184 ("No one... can pretend that the United States
makes any serious effort to regulate product quality directly.").
236. See Schwartz, supra note 235, at 1368.
237. See, e.g., Ealy v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 897 F. 2d 1159, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (S20
million compensatory damages award in products liability trial "did not 'shock the conscience"
of the trial court"); Verdicts, Nat'l LJ., Jan. 29, 1990, p. S12 (5152 million jury award to two
plaintiffs exposed to asbestos; case settled for undisclosed sum).
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in society which may directly or indirectly concern him as a con-
sumer," and his point of view "must contribute to the drawing up of
Community policies, ' 238 including directives. What is this person's
point of view? Community institutions have come up with
unimaginative answers. The Commission thought that the view
includes a desire for a development risks defense. 239  The Legal
Affairs Committee of Parliament retreated from considering the point
of view at all.2 ° Ultimately, that Committee thought it had to choose
between slighting consumer protection and agreeing with proponents
of the Directive.241 But although consumerism requires attention to
safety and to social welfare, it does not mandate liability without fault
on the part of the producer. This liability rule, as imposed on Europe,
hinders social progress as well as economic progress.
A final definition of harmonization remains. EC countries do not
use litigation for the instrumentalist or public law function that
prevails in United States; lawsuits do not achieve social goals. The
action at law in Europe has been expensive and hazardous since
Roman times.2 42 This disapproval of litigation shows a dislike for
open contention as a means to improve an individual's lot. Harmoni-
zation, in this new sense, means a preference for tranquil solutions
over strife.24 3
The struggles of the Directive have shown the European Commu-
nity that nonadversarial harmonization accords with pragmatic limi-
tations as well as a cultural tradition in Europe. A new law can be
devised in theory, but in democratic governments with independent
judiciaries it is almost impossible to decree changes in private law ia-
238. Directorate General, supra note 44, at PE 100.200, En 111/0.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 194-201.
240. See supra text accompanying note 189.
241. At the same time, American writers were beginning to perceive a subtler consumer, a
person who is more than a victim. Richard Epstein was an early challenger of the idea that
consumers are necessarily better off with pro-plaintiff rules in products liability law. See
Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 643 (1978);
Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 Am. Bar. Found. Res. J. 87
(1976). Although this work has convinced few consumer advocates, it has been the source of
an important literature.
242. See Thomas, Risk Management in the New Europe: Insurance and Financial
Management Issues, in European Economic Community, supra note 76, at 143-44.
243. According to a German historian, "already in the early Middle Ages public opinion
praised one principle-which applied to all economic and social measures-that it was better
to prevent than to heal, in other words, that as a matter of principle one should combat
everything that might possibly lead to conflicts." H. Bechtel, Wirtschafts-und Sozialgeschicte
Deutschlands 91 (1967). Cf. Glenn, Harmonization of Private Law Rules Between Civil and
Common Law Jurisdictions, General Report (on file at the Virginia Journal of International
Law) (1990) (harmonization as "continuing, non-conflictual relationship of differing laws").
[Vol. 31:673
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN EC
bility rules.2' These changes percolate from below. Grant Gilmore,
who disapproved of strict products liability when it was new, foresaw
that in the United States the concept would not be stopped: "There is
no point in arguing with a revolution," he wrote.245 Americans
waged a consumerist revolution in products liability law of necessity,
because they could not bring themselves to require the regulation and
social insurance needed for consumer protection. Attempting a simi-
lar revolution without inquiring whether it was desirable, the Direc-
tive created dissonance. But as the Community continues to blunt the
effect of the Directive, reaffirms its commitment to economic equality
and care for the afflicted, considers a better measure for safety, and
asserts its unified identity, it moves closer towards harmony.
244. The effort to decree ambitious changes in private law rules has been described as an
attempt to create a public law of liability. This focus unites the Directive with two public law
attempts in the United States: the creation of strict products liability and the tort reform
movement. See Bernstein, supra note 59.
245. Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. Chi. L Rev. 103, 116 (1970).
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